

Successful Agrarian Reforms

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Why Agrarian Reform?

- In 2010, 49% of the world's population was rural
- Poverty is concentrated in rural areas
- In rural areas, land is a key means of wealth accumulation for peasants
- Fiscal redistribution (e.g. taxation) weak in rural areas
- Land reform is therefore a path to equality; it is also tied to economic growth in key cases such as Taiwan and South Korea
- Land reform can also occur in more urban societies
- Greater land equality tied to lower rates of civil conflict


Two Visions of “Success”

- Equity: Breaking up extensive landholdings and granting them to the landless or land-poor, or inducing market-based transfers via progressive land taxes
- Efficiency/Economic Growth: Providing property rights security and getting land into the hands of those who use it most efficiently

The Conventional Wisdom: Democracy Supports Both Equity and Efficiency

- Democracy empowers the median voter, yielding a better match between citizen preferences and public policy
- Democracy is linked to greater rule of law; this supports the development of private property rights that stimulate investment and growth

Puzzle: Democracy and Inequality Coexist



Notes: Regime type a binary measure coded in 2008 based on data from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2009). Countries outlined in white have missing inequality data.

* Denotes that country meets democracy criteria with exception of rotation of party holding executive authority

Puzzle: Redistribution is Hardly Rare Under Autocracy

- From 1930-2008, 14% of *all of the land in Latin America* – 271 million hectares – transferred hands via land reform
- Of the 128 million hectares of land redistribution, over 80% occurred under autocracy
- Similar trend if we normalize by country size or cultivable land area
- Early welfare state initiatives in Europe also under autocracy (e.g., Germany's Bismarck and Austria's von Taaffe)


Puzzle: Autocracies Can Spur Growth-Enhancing Reforms

- Many (though hardly all) of the most successful land reforms from an efficiency perspective took place under autocracy or foreign occupation: Taiwan, South Korea, Japan

Overview of the Talk

- Equity successes and failures in land reform
- Most land reform that supports equity is historically done under autocracy; these often are not successful in terms of spurring economic growth and development
- Foundations of efficiency-enhancing reforms; common obstacles to implementation
- Contemporary land reform trends and how to make land reform work

Land Reform in Peru: Equity Success



1961



2008


Urubamba Valley, Peru

Land Reform in Peru



Source Sam L. Slick Collection of Latin American and Iberian Posters, Center for South West Research, University Libraries, University of New Mexico.

Land Reform in Mexico: Equity Success



Ejidos in Oaxaca and Chiapas, Mexico




Abolition of Pongueaje and Land Reform in Bolivia: Equity Success




Abolition of Huasipungaje and Land Reform in Ecuador: Equity Success



Land Reform in Colombia: Equity Failure




Land reform 1960-2000




Guerrilla attacks 1988-2000


Land Reform in *Punto Fijo* Venezuela: Equity Failure



Land Reform in Brazil: Equity Failure



(A) Land Invasions




(B) Land Reforms

Note: Data on land invasions are


from the Comissão Pastoral da Terra (CPT). Data on land reform are from the Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (INCRA).

Land Reform and Land Inequality

Land Gini in 1950 (top) and 1990 (bottom)



Change in Land Gini 1950-1990



Sources: Crespo (1991); Eckstein (1986); Frankema (2006)

Motivating Intuitions

- Process of redistribution requires more than median voter's preference: state apparatus and bureaucracy involved, subject to capture
- Elites can strengthen their own position in power by expropriating other elite groups: autocracy and weak PR

Land Redistribution is Institutionally Exacting

- Requires support of the executive, legislature, bureaucracy, and often the judiciary

Land Reform Step	Actors Required
1) Pass a land reform law	Executive; possibly legislature
2) Identify those landowners who meet the criteria for being affected by the reform	Landed elites and potential beneficiaries where land registry incomplete
3) Create or authorize an entity empowered to administer the reform	Executive; likely legislature
4) Create a legal framework for the adjudication of ownership and affectation claims in support of the reform	Executive; judiciary
5) Take possession of land subject to reform, whether through expropriation, or some purchasing mechanism (direct negotiation, auction, etc.)	Effective bureaucracy or military loyal to the executive
6) Assign land in the reform sector to eligible beneficiaries	Effective bureaucracy or military loyal to the executive; supportive beneficiaries
7) Enforce the new status quo distribution of land	Effective bureaucracy; loyal military; no political turnover that empowers landed elite
8) [Optional] Provide inputs, credit, and infrastructure to support beneficiaries	Legislature; possibly executive

- Large landowners can capture veto points through lobbying, malapportionment, elite-biased electoral institutions, clientelism; possible but harder under autocracy

Lower Institutional Constraints Conducive to Land Redistribution

- Why don't all autocrats redistribute land?


Elite Splits Provide Incentives

- Uncertainty is high at the outset of a new autocratic regime, this matters for the leader's initial support coalition (ISC)
- Expropriation of rival elite groups (landed elite) demonstrates leader loyalty to ISC; it also destroys a potential future threat
- ISC benefits even if they do not receive land; redistribution can then alleviate threat from below
- Incentives for land redistribution from degree of coalitional overlap between (i) political elites and their allies that comprise their initial support coalition; and (ii) landed elites
 - If ISC is comprised of/depends on landed elites, no land redistribution

Implications

- 1) Land redistribution is more likely when there is a ruling coalitional split between political and landed elites
- 2) This relationship is conditional on institutional constraints: veto points constrain the capacity to redistribute
- 3) Other types of land reform that do not threaten landed elite interests should be easier to implement across range of veto points

Land Redistribution, Elite Splits, and Institutional Constraints in Latin America, 1930-2008




Land Reform in Latin America, 1930-2008

Solid lines = Land redistribution

Dashed lines = Land negotiation

Dotted lines = Land colonization



Accounting for Other Factors

- Findings hold under a host of statistical analyses that address factors such as popular pressure, the Cold War, industrialization, urbanization, and previous reform
- Findings hold when accounting for left-wing ideology, contagion and spillover effects, foreign aid, geographic endowments, trade openness, declining land values, autocratic regime types, and dropping influential cases

Land Redistribution Around the World, 1900- 2008

Country	Years	Major/Minor Reform	Elite Split	Institutional Constraints	Details
Afghanistan	1979-1983	Major	Yes	Low	Amidst Soviet invasion
Albania	1945-1967	Major	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII
Algeria	1971-1978	Minor	Yes	Low	Mostly French land; cooperatives formed
Algeria	1980-1985	Minor	Yes	Low	Mostly French land; to private farmers
Bangladesh	1972-1977	Minor	Yes	Low	1972 Land Holding Limitation Order
Bulgaria	1920-1923	Major	Yes	Low	Stamboliski; private and village lands
Bulgaria	1946-1958	Major	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII
China	1949-1952	Major	Yes	Low	Communist Party following civil war
Czechoslovakia	1918-1937	Major	Yes	Low/High	Czech-led reform, German discrimination
Czechoslovakia	1945-1948	Minor	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII
East Germany	1945-1960	Major	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII
Egypt	1952-1978	Major	Yes	Low	Following Free Officers coup
Estonia	1917-1926	Major	Yes	High	Baltic-German, church, state lands seized
Ethiopia	1975-1988	Major	Yes	Low	Derg reforms
Finland	1924-1939	Minor	No	High	Lex Kallio law; 1938 law
Greece	1918-1925	Major	Yes	Low	Venizelos; absentee, large lands to refugees
Hungary	1921-1938	Minor	No	Low	Pál Teleki, limited under Party of Unity
Hungary	1945-1962	Major	Yes	Low	Communists, Independent Smallholders
India	1947-	Minor	Yes*	Low/High	Landholding ceilings implemented by states
Indonesia	1962-1969	Minor	Yes	Low	Basic Agrarian Law under Sukarno
Iran	1962-1971	Major	Yes	Low	White Revolution under the Shah
Iraq	1958-1982	Minor	Yes	Low	Following Free Officers coup
Italy	1948-1953	Minor	Yes	High	Aftermath of WWII; undercut Communists
Japan	1946-1949	Major	Yes	Low	Under post-WWII US occupation
Jordan	1959-1971	Minor	Yes	Low	Part of East Ghor Canal Project
Latvia	1920-1937	Major	Yes	High/Low	Mainly targeted Baltic Germans
Libya	1969-1970	Minor	Yes	Low	Confiscated Italian property
Lithuania	1920-1930	Major	Yes	Low	Mainly targeted nobles' land from Russia
Mongolia	1929-1932	Major	Yes	Low	Targeted nobility and Buddhist church
Morocco	1956-1972	Minor	Yes	Low	Upon independence, French and state land
Myanmar	1953-1958	Minor	Yes	High	Pyidawtha Plan, Chettyar and large lands
North Korea	1946-1947	Major	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII
North Vietnam	1954-1956	Major	Yes	Low	Lao Dong Party, transfers and rent refunds
Pakistan	1959-1990	Minor	Yes	Low	Begun in West, 1959; new PPP law, 1972
Philippines	1956-1957	Minor	Yes	High	1955 Land Reform Law under Magsaysay
Philippines	1973-1979	Minor	Yes	Low	1972 Land Reform Law under Marcos
Philippines	1988-	Minor	No	High	CARP/CARPER
Poland	1918-1938	Minor	Yes	Low	Land Reform Bill in aftermath of WWI
Poland	1944-48	Major	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII
Portugal	1975	Major	Yes	Low	Carnation Revolution under military
Romania	1921-1937	Major	Yes	Low	King Ferdinand after territorial expansion
Romania	1944-1948	Major	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII, communist pressure
Russia	1917-1927	Major	Yes	Low	Soviet Decree on Land and 1922 Code
South Korea	1948-1958	Major	Yes	Low	Japanese lands and large holdings
South Vietnam	1956-1973	Major	Yes	Low	Ordinance 57 and US-backed land-to-tiller
Spain	1932-1936	Minor	Yes	High	Prior to Spanish Civil War
Sri Lanka	1972-1990	Major	Yes	High/Medium	1972 law following 1958 Paddy Lands Bill
Syria	1958-1974	Minor	Yes	Low	UAR followed by Ba'ath party
Taiwan	1949-1955	Major	Yes	Low	KMT after Chinese civil war
Thailand	1975-2003	Minor	Yes	Low/High	Following 1973 coup; mostly public lands
Tunisia	1964-1969	Minor	Yes	Low	Seizure of remaining French land
Yugoslavia	1921-1930	Major	Yes	Low	Mainly targeted Germans and Hungarians
Yugoslavia	1945-1954	Major	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII under Communists
Zimbabwe	1992-	Major	Yes	Low	White lands targeted by Mugabe

Efficiency: Foundations of Success

- Secure property rights: stimulate private credit markets, private investment, and land markets
- Ability to capture the marginal product of labor via individual or clear collective rights: eliminate collective action barriers, common pool problems, and moral hazard problems
- State support in the form of infrastructure, inputs, and credits

Efficiency: Success and Failure

Country	Years of Land Reform	Collective Ownership	Restrictions on Sales/Rentals	Input/Credit Support	Details
Afghanistan	1979-83	No	Yes	Low	Amidst Soviet invasion
Albania	1945-67	Yes	Yes	Significant	Aftermath of WWII
Bolivia	1953-85	No	Yes	Low	MNR reform after 1952 revolution
Brazil	1964-	No	Yes	Low	1964 Land Act; continued by INCRA
Bulgaria	1920-23	No	No	Low	Stamboliski; private and village lands
Bulgaria	1946-58	Yes	Yes	Significant	Aftermath of WWII
Chile	1967-73	Yes	Yes	Significant	Frei and Allende; Pinochet reversed some
China	1949-52	Yes	Yes	Low	Communist Party following civil war
Cuba	1959-63	Yes	Yes	Low	Castro reform following Cuban revolution
Czechoslovakia	1918-37	No	No	Significant	Czech-led reform, German discrimination
Dominican Rep.	1934-85	No	Yes	Low	Trujillo, military, democratic regimes
East Germany	1945-60	Yes	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII
Egypt	1952-78	No	Yes	Significant	Following Free Officers coup
El Salvador	1980-85	Yes	Yes	Significant	Most under military junta
Estonia	1917-26	No	Yes	Significant	Baltic-German, church, state lands seized
Ethiopia	1975-88	Yes	Yes	Low	Derg reforms
Greece	1918-25	No	Yes	Low	Venizelos; absentee, large lands to refugees
Guatemala	1953-54	No	Yes	Significant	Under Arbenz; military reversed some
Hungary	1945-62	Yes	Yes	Significant	Communists, Independent Smallholders
Iran	1962-71	No	Yes	Significant	White Revolution under the Shah
Japan	1946-49	No	Yes	High	Under post-WWII US occupation
Latvia	1920-37	No	No	Significant	Mainly targeted Baltic Germans
Lithuania	1920-30	No	No	Significant	Mainly targeted nobles' land from Russia
Mexico	1917-92	Yes	Yes	Low	Targeted large owners; most under PRI
Mongolia	1929-32	Yes	Yes	Low	Targeted nobility and Buddhist church
Nicaragua	1979-89	Yes	Yes	Low	Sandinistas following 1979 revolution
North Korea	1946-47	Yes	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII
North Vietnam	1954-56	Yes	Yes	Low	Lao Dong Party, transfers and rent refunds
Panama	1968-83	Yes	Yes	High	Military rule under Torrijos
Peru	1964-90	Yes	Yes	Low	Most under military rule 1968-80
Poland	1944-48	No	Yes	Significant	Aftermath of WWII
Portugal	1975	No	Yes	Low	Carnation Revolution under military
Romania	1921-37	No	No	Low	King Ferdinand after territorial expansion
Romania	1944-48	Yes	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII, communist pressure
South Korea	1948-58	No	Yes	High	Japanese lands and large holdings
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Soviet Union	1917-27	Yes	Yes	Low	Soviet Decree on Land and 1922 Code
Sri Lanka	1972-90	Yes	Yes	Significant	1972 law following 1958 Paddy Lands Bill
Taiwan	1949-55	No	Yes	High	KMT after Chinese civil war
Tanzania	1963-76	Yes	Yes	Low	Nationalization followed by villagization
Venezuela	2005-	Yes	Yes	Significant	Under Chávez and 2005 Land Law
Yugoslavia	1921-30	No	No	Low	Mainly targeted Germans and Hungarians
Yugoslavia	1945-54	No	Yes	Low	Aftermath of WWII under Communists
Zimbabwe	1992-	No	Yes	Low	White lands targeted by Mugabe

Efficiency Consequences in Latin America

- Mexico: failure – areas with more land reform experienced lower subsequent growth rates
- Peru: failure
- Cuba: failure
- Venezuela: failure (both *punto fijo* and PSUV)
- Brazil: mixed (little state support)
- Colombia: mixed (too small-scale; undercut by civil conflict)

Efficiency Failure Can be Political Success: The Case of Mexico



Efficiency Successes

- Japan
- South Korea
- Taiwan
- India
- Interwar reforms in the Baltics

Land Reform for the 21st Century: The Obstacles

- Major equity-oriented reforms like those in Taiwan, South Korea, and Peru are less likely because of institutional constraints in many of the world's new democracies
- Progressive land taxes as an alternative to reform is still ineffectual: developing states are relatively weak, land cadasters are incomplete, evasion is widespread, and globalization induces a “race to the bottom”

The Alternative to Redistribution: Land Negotiation and Colonization

- These types of reform respect private property
- Examples: Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, South Africa, Philippines
- Problems: Too small-scale and not strongly equity-enhancing; therefore not that popular

Ideas for Moving Forward

- 1) Greater partnership between governments, international actors, and private domestic actors to provide funding and make land available
- Example: Colombia's Victims Law supported by the UN, OAS, various countries; perhaps Land Funds through a peace agreement with the FARC?

Ideas for Moving Forward

- 2) Create a parallel reform track that operates from the bottom up by harnessing mapping technology, social media, and existing databases to identify regions or properties for reform, and then deploy mobile units to match parcels to land petitioners
- Funding via NGOs, private-public partnerships, World Bank, or private donors
- Could also work for providing agricultural inputs

Ideas for Moving Forward

- 3) Loosen the compensation standards for land negotiation in order to generate a greater supply of land for transfers
- Need involvement of World Bank or other international organizations that can shift standards
- Example: South Africa

Conclusions

- Most equity-enhancing reforms have occurred under autocratic rule; institutional constraints block major redistributive reforms under democracy
- Equity-oriented reforms have often favored politics over efficiency that would support economic growth
- Efficiency-oriented reforms are often too small-scale
- Land negotiation and colonization now predominate; most plausible paths forward are more funding and a bottom-up data-driven approach to identifying reform need and transferring property/funding inputs

Q&A

Puzzle: Democratization Often Occurs When Landowners Powerful

- Many argue that specificity of assets and demand for cheap labor makes landowners systematically anti-democratic: A&R 2006, Ansell and Samuels 2014, Boix 2003, Gerschenkron 1946, Moore 1966, Ziblatt 2008
- Yet landed elites often survive and even thrive under democracy: Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Philippines, South Africa, Venezuela
 - Payne (1992, 19): "[L]andholders are unlikely to deliberately undermine the democratic transition since they have retained both influence and protection throughout that political process."

Landed Elites vs. Rural Poor

Table 2.1. Land Distribution in Latin America, 1950-1970

Country	Year	Less than 5 Hectares				Greater than 200 Hectares			
		Number of Holdings	% of Holdings	Area of Holdings	% Area of Holdings	Number of Holdings	% of Holdings	Area of Holdings	% Area of Holdings
Bolivia	1950	51000	60.0	74000	0.2	9400	11.1	31910000	97.4
Brazil	1950	458000	22.2	1170000	0.5	170000	8.2	175286000	75.5
	1960	1033000	30.9	2537000	1.0	190000	5.7	174579000	69.9
	1970	1801000	36.7	3897000	1.3	236000	4.8	195292000	66.4
Colombia	1954	505000	55.0	927000	3.3	23000	2.5	15848000	57.1
	1960	757000	62.6	1239000	4.5	21000	1.7	15047000	55.0
	1971	701000	59.6	1147000	3.7	24000	2.0	17355000	56.0
Costa Rica	1950	17000	39.5	37000	2.0	1100	2.6	972000	53.6
	1963	25000	38.5	53000	2.0	1600	2.5	1355000	50.8
	1973	40000	48.8	59000	1.9	2800	3.4	1701000	54.5
Cuba	1946	32000	20.0	85700	0.9	20700	12.9	6448000	71.0
Dominican Rep.	1950	210000	76.4	318000	13.7	1000	0.4	851000	36.6
	1960	385000	86.1	472000	20.9	800	0.2	778000	34.5
	1971	235000	77.0	352000	12.9	1400	0.5	1048000	38.3
Ecuador	1954	251000	73.0	432000	7.2	3200	0.9	3400000	56.7
	1974	336000	64.7	539000	6.8	6000	1.2	3127000	39.3
El Salvador	1950	140000	80.5	190000	12.4	1000	0.6	618000	40.4
	1961	190000	84.8	232000	14.9	1000	0.4	589000	37.8
	1971	282000	88.7	283000	19.5	700	0.2	410000	28.2
Honduras	1952	88000	56.4	202000	8.1	1300	0.8	953000	38.0
	1974	125000	64.1	240000	9.1	1500	0.8	892000	33.9
Mexico	1950	1004000	72.6	1363000	0.9	55000	4.0	131995000	90.7
	1960	900000	65.9	1328000	0.8	68000	5.0	152467000	90.2
	1970	609000	59.7	881000	0.6	64000	6.3	125598000	89.8
Panama	1950	45000	52.9	96000	8.3	400	0.5	308000	26.6
	1960	44000	46.3	95000	5.3	900	0.9	560000	31.0
	1971	64000	55.7	77000	3.7	1300	1.1	718000	34.2
Peru	1961	728000	83.7	1036000	5.8	6000	0.7	14302000	80.7
	1972	1105000	79.4	1560000	6.6	8000	0.6	16858000	71.6
Uruguay	1951	11000	12.9	29000	0.2	14000	16.5		
	1961	12000	13.8	34000	0.2	15000	17.2	14457000	85.1
	1970	11000	14.3	30000	0.2	14000	18.2	14338000	86.8
Venezuela	1961	160000	50.0	278000	1.1	13000	4.1	22265000	85.6
	1971	126000	43.8	342000	1.3	17000	5.9	22492000	85.0

Sources: Author's calculations based on FAO (1981); Censo agropecuario de 1950 (Bolivia); Hendrix (1996) (Cuba).

Political Elites

Table 2.2. Key Political Elites in Venezuela, 1945-48


Members and Backgrounds of Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno	Key Political Elites	Initial Support Coalition
<p>1. Rómulo Betancourt (AD). Former s\$%&' (\$)' *& +,! -.)' &/ ' 0' +*)!\$ 1 ' /,!23%& &!45!.(! 67" 68</p> <p>2. Carlos Delgado Chalbaud (UPM). Raised in exile in France; engineer and military officer.</p> <p>3. Mario Vargas (UPM). Career military officer; attended the Escuela Militar de Venezuela.</p> <p>4. Gonzalo Barrios (AD). Raised in Barquisimeto; doctorate from UCV; elected Senator in Portuguesa prior to exile; helped form AD.</p> <p>5. Luis Beltrán Prieto (AD). Raised in Nueva Esparta; doctorate from UCV; founded first national teachers union.</p> <p>6. Raúl Leoni (AD). Raised in Bolívar; former student leader; lawyer.</p> <p>7. Edmundo Fernández (Independent). Born in Caracas; jailed as student leader; doctor.</p>	<p>1. Junta members</p> <p>2. Cabinet members</p> <p>a. Carlos Morales</p> <p>b. Carlos D'Ascoli</p> <p>c. Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso</p> <p>d. Luis Lander</p> <p>e. Eduardo Mendoza Goiticoa</p> <p>f. Valmore Rodríguez</p> <p>g. Humberto García Arocha</p>	<p>1. Acción Democrática: Popular political party founded by Betancourt and populated with middle-class activists.</p> <p>2. Unión Patriótica Militar: Group of disaffected military officers who opposed Medina's rule and wanted increased pay, better equipment, and more predictable promotions. Founded by Captain Mario Vargas and led by Marcos Pérez Jiménez.</p>

Note: AD indicates membership in Acción Democrática. UPM indicates membership in the Unión Patriótica Militar. These political elites handed over power to Rómulo Gallegos, who was inaugurated in 1948.

Implications for Political Regimes


- If elites recognize that dictatorship can be worse for them than democracy, democratization is more likely in the presence of high inequality
- If elites can impose institutional and informal roadblocks to redistribution, they may push to democratize

The Economic Importance of Land in Latin America



Timing of Land Expropriation

Figure 1B. Predicted Likelihood of Land Expropriation over Time



Note: These predictions are generated from Table 2, Column 1.



Elites Pushing for Democracy: The Case of Bolivia

- “With corruption and restlessness in the military at very high levels, and with officers representing every possible political line, the civilian elite could not trust the outcome of an anti-Banzer coup, since there was no way of knowing if the next leader would be a Torres, a Barrientos, or a Banzer...[T]he elite felt their needs could be better defended through civilian party rule.” (Klein 1992, 262)

Ideology and Redistribution

- Where did leftist governments not redistribute land at a large scale?
 - Argentina 1975-76; Bolivia 1979, 1983-85, 1990; Costa Rica 1975-78, 1983-90; Dominican Republic 1975-86; Ecuador 1983-85, 1989-90; Mexico 1983-90; Nicaragua 1980-82, 1987-90; Peru 1986-90; Venezuela 1975-78, 1984-90
- Where did right-leaning governments implement large-scale land redistribution?
 - Bolivia 1975-77; Chile 1975-79 (reversal)

Veto Points by Regime Episode




Why Are the Countries That Experienced Large-Scale Land Redistribution Under Autocracy Still So Unequal?

- Land is not the same as income, and land is now much more equal in places that experienced large-scale land reform if we look at land inequality
- Some countries that experienced large-scale reform started with higher than average land inequality, but reforms reduced land and wealth inequality (Klein 1992; Mayer 2009; McClintock 1981)
- There has been some reversion toward land inequality under democracy (e.g. Colombia/Venezuela since 1990)

Is the Lack of Association Between Democracy and Redistribution Because Democracies are Following Redistributive Autocracies?

- Democracy is not simply following autocracy
- Prior redistribution included in empirical analyses




- I predict that democracy should not be redistributive when a redistributive autocrat is a threat and elites exit democracy on their own terms

US Intervention: Stymieing Redistribution Under Democracy?

- Gradual redistribution is unlikely to have triggered a coup, but is not associated with democracy
- Being autocratic but communist/leftist wouldn't have spared intervention

The Economic Importance of Land in Latin America, 1990



Land Redistribution by Regime Type in Latin America, 1951-90

Autocracy

Democracy



Indicator: Average Yearly Land Redistribution as a Proportion of Cultivable Land

How Does Redistribution Reduce Pressure from Below?

- Smallholders are less likely to rebel, and they are the most influential given organizational capacity (Paige 1975)
- Evidence from Colombia indicates that land reform can reduce rebellion if implemented at a large enough scale
- In Peru: reform targeted at areas with greater “structural” pressure from below